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ABSTRACT
The first part of this thesis presents an analysis on the factors contributing to groundings
when ships transit in and out of ports. The study has been part of a three-year project on
"Ship Transit Risk". By verifying the grounding location database generated during the
first two years of the project against the United States Coast Guard's grounding accident
data, an updated database was established in this research. Within the frame of this new
database, two factors were analyzed-tide and time of day. The results suggest that tide
forecast error (predicted tide water level minus observed tide water level) had no
significant effect as a risk factor, and that night navigation was far more risky than day
navigation.
The second part of this thesis presents a complementary point of view for risk analysis-
human factors. Many papers indicate that human beings are the most significant factors
contributing to groundings. Nevertheless, few or no historical data sets recorded the
information required for human factors analysis. Hence this part focuses mostly on
literature review, introduces briefly the concept of the International Safety Management
(ISM) Code, and some maritime regulations and final rules of OSHA (Occupational
Safety and Health Administration). OSHA contributes to much research in human
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factors, yet few maritime related papers pay attention to it. Thus, we suggest that for
further research on human factors, the collaboration of OSHA and maritime related
research organizations such as USCG is necessary. The cooperative research would
greatly contribute to the success of a risk model for groundings that may be also applied
to other accident analysis. In addition, the exploration of a risk model for groundings
may have a positive effect on the ISM code and OSHA's final rules in the future.
Thesis Co-Supervisors: Nicholas M. Patrikalakis
Title: Professor of Ocean Engineering
Hauke L. Kite-Powell
Research Specialist (WHOI)
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Chapter 1. "SHIP TRANSIT RISK" PROJECT
1.1 Introduction
Groundings of commercial ships contribute to one third of all commercial maritime
accidents, including some of the worst in the United States' history. While clearly any
efforts to reduce transit risk are important and beneficial to maritime transport, this thesis
presents an analysis of the physical risk component contributing to groundings when
ships transit in and out of ports.
More specifically, the first part of this thesis collected and analyzed historical data on
factors surrounding accidents in five U.S. ports between 1981 and 1995. By verifying the
grounding location database generated by Jebsen and Papakonstantinou [1] in previous
reports of the MIT Ship Transit Risk project against the United States Coast Guard's
grounding accident data, an updated database was established in this research. Within the
frame of this new database, two factors were analyzed-tide and time of the day.
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Chapters 4 and 5 present a detailed discussion and results of the analysis of these two
factors.
The second part of this thesis presents a complementary point of view for risk analysis-
human factors. Although many papers indicate that human factors as the most significant
element contributing to groundings, few if any historical data record the information
required, especially qualitative information, for human factors analysis. Human factors
analysis is a challenging problem and requires broader studies beyond merely focusing on
transit accidents. Note that the purpose of the thesis is to investigate the physical risk
factors between the circumstances surrounding a transit and the occurrence of accidents,
based on historical data. Hence this part focuses only on literature review, introduces
briefly the concept of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, and some
maritime regulations and final rules of Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). OSHA contributes to much research in human factors, yet few maritime related
papers pay attention to it. Thus, we suggest that for further research on human factors,
the collaboration of OSHA and maritime related organizations such as USCG is
necessary. This cooperative research would contribute greatly to the success of a risk
model for groundings that may be applied to other accident analysis. In addition, the
exploration of a risk model for groundings may have a positive effect on the ISM code
and OSHA's final rules in the future.
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1.2 Project Background
This thesis is part of project "Ship Transit Risk", which is funded by the MIT Sea Grant
College Program under grant NA46RG0434 from the National Sea Grant College
Program, NOAA, Department of Commerce; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers; the Marine Policy Center of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution;
and the Department of Ocean Engineering, MIT. The purpose of the project is to develop
models for quantitative assessment of navigational risks entailed by vessels during
transits into and out of ports. It is a three-year project that employs historical casualty
data to build these models. The previous thesis by Jebsen and Papakonstantinou[1]
summarized a good portion of the work performed over the first two years of the project.
The efforts during that period focused on the modeling of grounding risk at the port level,
with special emphasis on the contribution of inaccuracies in navigation charts.
This thesis follows their thesis "Evaluation of the Physical Risk of Ship Grounding",
under the supervision of Dr. Hauke L. Kite-Powell and Professor Nicholas M.
Patrikalakis. It continues to collect, verify, assimilate, evaluate, and analyze historical
data on groundings. Prof. N. M. Patrikalakis from the Design Laboratory of the Ocean
Engineering Department at MIT and Dr. H. Kite-Powell from the Marine Policy Center at
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution are the principal investigators of this project.
For a more detailed description of the project, please see Kite-Powell et al. [2, 32, 33] and
Jebsen and Papakonstantinou [1].
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
For the purpose of the modeling activities, many relevant publications in the risk analysis
and assessment field have been reviewed in previous reports of this project. Two papers
related to this thesis are summarized here:
Firstly, the study "Tanker Spills, Prevention by Design" [5] provided helpful background
information of this thesis, although it focused on a "spill-free" tanker from a design point
of view. The study focused on the safety, economic and environmental implications of
alternative tank vessel designs and was expected to determine how these designs might
affect the overall consequences of accidents. More specifically, the study made it clear
from the very beginning that the improvement of tank vessel design was not the only way
to reduce the risk of oil pollution and its consequences [1]. Approaches such as crew
training, electronic charts and vessel traffic systems were outside of the scope of the
study and therefore were not judged [5].
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The study discussed the need for further substantive research, that the U.S. federal
government, industry and academia should undertake in a coordinated manner, directed
to:
* performing a comprehensive risk-assessment study that would lead to establishment
of future risk-based design goals for tank vessels with attendant compliance guidance;
* accomplishing the basic research needs noted throughout the study;
* testing and evaluation of design concepts, including theoretical analysis, model tests,
and field tests;
* advancing the capability to assess and evaluate natural resource damages; and
* achieving optimal pollution control by integrating use of design alternatives with
operational considerations [5].
Secondly, "The Port Needs Study" aimed at documenting the costs and benefits of
potential U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) in selected U.S. ports on the
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts [3]. Although the study was completed in August 1991,
it was the first comprehensive study that estimated vessel casualties on the basis of a
navigational risk model developed from regression analysis of aggregate historical
casualties and related navigational risk factors. It included the most exhaustive analysis to
date of the commercial and environmental impacts of hazardous commodity spills and,
according to the authors, was the most comprehensive quantitative analysis to date
performed in the subject area. Its four-volume report contained a considerable amount of
valuable information on exposure to risk, operating environments, VTS technologies,
VTS effectiveness, and costs and benefits. Coast Guard casualty records were used as the
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exclusive accident data set. Near miss and port incident data were not used [1,3]. Six
primary data sources were used in this study:
* USCG's Casualty Maintenance Database records (CASMAIN),
* USCG's Personnel Casualty Database (PCAS, linked to CASMAIN),
* USCG's Marine Pollution Retrieval System (MPRS),
* The pollution segment of USCG's Marine Safety Information System (MSIS),
* National Transportation Safety Board reports, and
* Confirmation with Coast Guard offices in the study zones.
The findings of the study were divided into a variety of topical areas such as avoided
vessel damage, human deaths and injuries, emergency response, bridge damage, cargo
damage and loss, navigational aid damage, LNG and LPG explosions, and hazardous
commodity spills, etc. For example, the candidate VTS designs for the 23 study zones
were projected to avoid a total of 980 vessel casualties during the period 1996 - 2010;
that represented a 29% decrease compared to vessel casualties projected without any
VTS. The ports which would benefit the most from VTS presence with respect to avoided
vessel casualties included New Orleans (375 casualties expected to be prevented, 56%
involving barge tows), Port Arthur (75 casualties expected to be prevented), New York
(73 casualties expected to be prevented) and Pudget Sound (60 casualties expected to be
prevented) [1,3].
For a more detailed description of relevant literature, please see Jebsen and
Papakonstantinou [1].
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A similar methodology has been used in Psaraftis et al. [34]. The study utilized a
systematic approach to analyze factors contributing to maritime transportation risk.
Some databases such as Lloyds List Casualty Reports were used. Additionally, some
extracted physical risk factors such as ship flag, ship type, ship age, ship size, etc. were
analyzed. When dealing with the historical accidents database, they encountered the
same problem we faced-deficiency of systems (e.g., lack of incident causes) and lack of
homogeneity in quality of the data. Savenije [35] follows a different approach. He
characterized risks associated with navigation hazards by calculating a subset of available
accident data and estimating the probability of accident. In addition, sensitivity analysis
was used for understanding and analyzing the total process. This approach could also be
found in "The Port Needs Study" [3] and Dickins and Krajczar [43].
Silver et al. [37] presented another risk-based methodology to determine optimum
channel depth. The study presented a predicting system for underkeel clearance and the
corresponding risk of grounding especially for deep draft vessels transiting shallow
entrance channels. The results indicated significant cost reduction on dredging and
environmental impacts. The approach has been important in activities of U.S. Navy and
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE).
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Chapter 3. APPROACH
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of the three-year project has been to develop a tool that explains transit risk
for a given waterway configuration, vessel type, and channel design. In particular, a risk
model has been developed to help predict the risk of groundings and associated economic
damage, such as loss of cargo and environmental resources. This model could be used to
help evaluate changes in risk due to proposed changes in waterway configuration, and
thereby inform resource allocation decisions to help achieve the most cost-effective
reduction of risk [1,2]. The physical risk model can be described as a function that
expresses the probability of an accident on a particular transit in terms of a set of risk
factors or "explanatory variables" [32]. More specifically, this model attempts to
estimate the conditional probability of A (A is defined as the event that a transit results in
a grounding (G) or a collision (C)) given a specified value x of explanatory variables X:
I
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p(Alx) = l(xlA) p / (l(xlA) p + l(xIS) (l-p))
where p is the unconditional probability of A and where l(xlA) and l(xIS) are the
likelihoods of x given A and S, respectively. S denotes the event that the transit is
completed safely (for a more detailed description, see [32]).
This approach, according to Kite-Powell et al. [32], has the advantage of permitting the
inclusion of a range of potential contributing factors.
Previous studies done by Prof. M. E. Pat6-Cornell (for a more detailed review, see [1]),
and Prof. Martha Gabowski [39] on risk analysis and risk management applied to
offshore platforms are helpful for our physical risk factors analysis. Another approach is
presented by Amrozowicz et al. [41,42,50]. In these studies by Amrozowicz et al., fault
tree analysis has been used to provide a more detailed view of how groundings are
caused. In addition, the studies incorporated the method of probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) and utilized the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) as a
quantitative method to predict individual human error probabilities (HEPs). The
grounding PRA model noted that because individual errors are a subset of human
failures, which are a subset of system failures, it is critical that the reduction of individual
errors rate should be encompassed with a total systems approach. However, this
approach requires extensive quantitative data set, which is beyond what is available in the
historical record.
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3.2 Approach in the Study
This thesis aims to produce an improved understanding of the factors contributing to
vessel groundings, as well as a quantitative risk assessment methodology useful in
physical risk factors analysis.
In the first part of this thesis, statistical analysis of existing historical databases of
accidents and safe transits was used. Five U.S. ports, including Boston,
Houston/Galveston, New York/Battery, Tampa/St. Petersburg, and San Francisco, were
the study regions. The study period was between 1981 and 1995. The casualty data was
from the United States Coast Guard, the transit data was from U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the environmental data was from NOAA. The grounding location
database established by previous reports in the project was the starting point of this study.
Chapter 4 addresses the quantitative analysis of potential risk factors and Chapter 5
demonstrates the results.
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Chapter 4. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL CRITERIA
This chapter uses statistical analysis to examine an updated grounding location database,
which was based on a previous database developed by Jebsen and Papakonstantinou [1]
from historical databases of accidents and safe transits. Investigating potential risk in
dredged channels versus open waters is the major concern. Five U.S. ports were the
study regions. The study period was between 1981 and 1995. In addition, two potential
risk factors (tide and time of day) were extracted from other data resources for our
analysis.
4.1 Collection and Verification of the Data Sets Established in Previous
Reports
Step 1: Become familiar with a variety of data sources, extracting records from data files
such as CASMAIN, MINMOD, and NOAA historical data used by the previous report
"Evaluation of the Physical Risk of Ship Grounding" [1].
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Step 2: Select application software for the analysis of grounding risk. For the purpose of
efficient data entry, verification, updates, deletions, and management, we selected the
same application development platform as the previous study - Microsoft Access for
Windows 95 and Microsoft Excel 97 as our basic analysis tools.
Step 3: Extract the grounding data sets, the study is interested in, both in dredged
channels and open water. Then for the purpose of accuracy, verify the database which
includes the grounding accidents in open water and dredged channels in five ports
established by Jebsen and Papakonstantinou [1].
Step 4: Verify the locations of all grounding accidents as plotted on charts by Jebsen and
Papakonstantinou [1].
Step 5: Establish an updated grounding location database. Using this new data set,
further research such as tide analysis and time of day/night analysis is performed.
4.2 Processing tide level data sets
Step 1: Collect tide data from NOAA.
Step 2: Manipulate tide level data useful for our analysis. Unfortunately, when
processing the tide data provided by NOAA, we encountered the following problems and
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as a result spent considerable time constructing the distribution of the difference between
predicted and observed values for each port:
1. Different format: the observed values were different from the predicted values in
format in Boston and New York database, which made data integration difficult.
2. Different elevation datum: dealing with different elevation datum is not
conceptually difficult, but is time-consuming. We converted the different elevations for
each port's tide database to a single standard unit, mm above MLLW. MLLW means
"mean lower low water", which is a reference point defined by NOAA at each tide
station. It represents an "average" low water level. Step 3 has more detailed discussion
on this topic.
Overall, to analyze the tide forecast error, it is vital to carefully verify and eliminate the
unmatched records between observed and predicted data files.
One processing problem to mention here is that some of the database is too large for
Microsoft Excel. One solution is to split the original database to several packages or to
change the original format within the limits of Microsoft Excel.
Step 3: Calculate tide level data and tide forecast error.
1. Calculate the probability density function and cumulative distribution function
for predicted and observed water heights for each port. In this step, there is no need to
remove any records from any of the data sets, because the different number of data points
I
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in each set will be accounted for by normalizing the "counts" by the appropriate total
number of data points.
2. Compute the probability density function and cumulative distribution function for
the difference between predicted and observed water heights for each port to calculate the
forecast error. In this step, carefully checking that the predicted and observed data "line
up" correctly for each port. In addition, it is necessary to remove any data points in either
the predicted or observed set that do not have a corresponding point in time in the other
data set.
To adjust for the time difference when processing the observed tide level at the time of an
accident, this study added the time difference to predicted data and to the time reported in
the United States Coast Guard accident data to analyze the groundings.
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4.3 Processing Time Data Sets
We first separated time slots to day time and night time from the groundings database
described in session 3.1, then worked on time analysis to see whether it is a potential
factor contributing to groundings. In order to conduct the analysis, we planned to
compare groundings in day and night with ACE (Army Corps of Engineers) safe transit
data in that same time slot, which, unfortunately we were not able to obtain. Hence, we
made a simple assumption that the number of vessel transits during day time is equal to
that of night time every day for each port.
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Chapter 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Open Water Versus Dredged Channels
A new database was established to investigate grounding locations for five areas:
Houston/Galveston, Tampa, Boston, New York and San Francisco. The data were
obtained from the grounding accident databases of United States Coast Guard from 1981
to 1995. Table 1 presents the accident numbers in the major grounding locations for each
city. A summary of the accidents in the all five ports is also presented in Table 1. The
accidents were plotted on nautical charts. Of the total 1116 grounding accidents in the
five ports, 908 had a valid location entry corresponding to the grounding, i.e., clearly
reported latitude and longitude. 687 (76%) were in or very close to dredged channels and
75 (8%) in the open water. However, 146 (16%) were in a "Questionable location", such
as land or very shallow areas (see Figure 1). Compared to the results obtained by Jebsen
and Papakonstantinou [1], most of the results obtained in this study were precisely the
same as those in the previous survey, but some were slightly different.
Summarized Grounding Location Information
No location:
Valid accidents:
of which were located in:
Dredged channel:
Open water:
Questionable location:
26
6
20
107
508
24
'70
18
153
531 208
157 908
9 362 44 135 137 687
122
508
4
153
12
157
Questionable location
16%
8 %Open Water
Dredged Channel
Valid grounding locations from 1981 to 1995 ( 908 accidents
within five study ports)
Figure 1 - Grounding Locations within Five Study Areas from 1981 to 1995
Table 1
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146
908
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Table 2 presents the average wind speed (meters/second), visibility (km) and the accident
numbers in dredged channels and open water for each port. Results in Figure 2.1 and
Figure 2.2 show no noticeable pattern among the five ports. The average wind speed and
visibility in dredged channel groundings was significantly higher than that in open water
in Houston/Galveston and Tampa. However, the results obtained in New York, Boston
and San Francisco showed a different pattern. Such observations suggest that wind speed
and visibility effects are not significantly different for accidents occurring in dredged
channels and in open water. In a future study, a more careful analysis of the data for
Houston/Galveston, San Francisco, Tampa/St. Petersburg, and New York/Battery is
suggested to verify these two risk factors.
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Table 2 Average Wind Speed and Visibility
Dredged Open Dredged Open Dredged Open Dredged Open Dredged Open
Channel Water Channel Water Channel Water Channel Water Channel Water
Valid accidents: 9 9 362 24 44 20 135 14 137 8
Average Wind(m/s): 6.17 6.41 3.71 3.65 5.11 4.62 3.64 3.28 6.06 6.53
Average Visibility(km): 10.64 9.53 14.05 11.57 17.35 21.84 12.73 10.94 11.41 13.95
(Average wind: meters/sec; Average visibility: kilometer)
Average Wind Speed for Valid Accidents
*Dredged channel
oOpen water
Port
- Average Wind Speed for Valid Accidents within Five Ports
Figure 2.2 - Average Visibility for Valid Accidents within Five Ports
Figure 2.1
Average Visibility for Valid Accidents
23.0
21.0
19.07  D redged
S15.0 channelE 13.0
o 11.0 .oOpen water
9.0
7.0
5.0
3.0
Port
f /ko 11*
- . I
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5.2 Tide Analysis-Predicted and Observed Water Levels
To investigate the relation between the predicted and observed water levels, the
probability density function and cumulative distribution function of the two water levels,
and their difference were used in this study. The records were obtained from the past 15
to 18 years. For Boston port, the results are shown in Figures 3 to 5 (see pp. 55 - 57).
Figure 6 to Figure 17 (see pp. 58 - 69) present the tide analysis for the other four ports.
Figures 3 and 15 (see p. 55, p. 67) show a similar tide pattern between Boston and New
York, and this may be due to the geographical proximity of both cities. Based on the
results of Figures 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 (see p. 55, p. 58, p. 61, p. 64, p. 67), there is no
evidence that the difference between the predicted records and the observed records is
significant for any of the five ports. Figures 5, 8, 11, 14, and 17 (see p. 57, p. 60, p. 63, p.
66, p. 69) demonstrate the extensive analysis of the water level forecasting error, for
which the data were obtained as described in Chapter 4. Those results confirm the
previous conclusion that there is no evidence that the difference between the predicted
records and the observed records is significant for any of the five ports. The results also
show that the model predictions tend to underestimate tide level for the past 15 to 18
years, except for Houston/Galveston.
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5.3 Effect of Forecast Error of Tide on Groundings
Results of the previous study [1] in this project clearly showed that environmental
factors, wind speed and visibility, have an effect on the grounding risk. However, in that
study, other important physical waterway characteristics, such as tide, were not
discussed. The tide factor was addressed and further studied in this thesis to determine
the significance of this factor to groundings. To understand the effect of tide, the forecast
error of tide, i.e. the difference between predicted water level and observed water level,
was used.
Our hypothesis was that a larger positive tide forecast error, the difference between
predicted water level and observed water level, causes a greater potential risk for
grounding. This hypothesis was not confirmed by the findings of this study. It was
observed that in dredged channels and open water, there was no significant correlation
between large forecast errors and the incidence of groundings.
Results of the effect of the forecast error on the groudings for five ports are presented in
Figures 18 to 22 (see pp. 70 - 74). Due to very few data for groundings in Boston, it was
difficult to use the probability density function to investigate the relation between the
forecast error and groundings. Hence it is not meaningful to draw accurate conclusions
based on the data in Figure 18 (see p. 70). The results of Figures 19 to 22 (see pp. 71-
74) show that there is no consistent pattern among the four ports. In addition, most of the
figures demonstrate insignificant relationship between positive tide forecast error and
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grounding accidents. However, in Figure 19 (see p. 71), the positive tide forecast error
appeared to lead to more grounding accidents in open water in Houston/Galveston.
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5.4 Effect of Time on Groundings
As discussed previously in section 4.3, grounding times were divided by day time and
night time. The day time was defined from 6:00am to 6:00pm local time, and night time
was defined from 6:00pm to 6:00am local time. The reason for dividing time slots was
that the corresponding time code in pre-MINMOD (1992) accident spreadsheets fell into
four ambiguous levels: day time, night time, twilight (morning or evening), and no
information -- none of which corresponds with accurate time records. In addition, due to
lack of information about distributions of transits by time of day from the Army Corps of
Engineers (ACE), this study made a conservative simple assumption that the number of
vessel transits during day time was equal to that of night time every day for each port.
Results of the effect of time on the groundings for five ports are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 demonstrates no consistent pattern among the five ports whether night navigation
in dredged channels is safer than in open water or vice versa. However, the results
suggest that, consistent with our intuition, night navigation was far more risky than day
navigation (although dredged channel navigation in New York port was an exception).
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Table 3 Summarized Grounding Ratio Information
Boston Area:
Accidents of which were Day Time Night Time Evening or Question- Total Total
located in: Morning able Time Accidents
Dredged channel: 0.22 0.56 0.00 0.22 1.00 9
Open water: 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 9
Questionable location: 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2
No location: 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.17 1.00 6
Total 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.12 1.00 26
New York Area:
Accidents of which were Day Time Night Time Evening or Question- Total Total
located in: Morning able Time Accidents
Dredged channel: 0.49 0.37 0.08 0.06 1.00 137
Open water: 0.38 0.50 0.13 0.00 1.00 8
Questionable location: 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 12
No location: 0.55 0.38 0.04 0.04 1.00 53
Total 0.50 0.39 0.07 0.05 1.00 210
Houston/Galveston Area:
Accidents of which were Day Time Night Time Evening or Question- Total Total
located in: Morning able Time Accidents
Dredged channel: 0.08 0.44 0.43 0.05 1.00 362
Open water: 0.08 0.13 0.63 0.17 1.00 24
Questionable location: 0.03 0.42 0.51 0.04 1.00 122
No location: 0.07 0.51 0.40 0.01 1.00 107
Total 0.07 0.44 0.45 0.05 1.00 615
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Tampa/St. Petersburg Area:
Accidents of which were Day Time Night Time Evening or Question- Total Total
located in: Morning able Time Accidents
Dredged channel: 0.05 0.50 0.37 0.08 1.00 135
Open water: 0.00 0.29 0.50 0.21 1.00 14
Questionable location: 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 1.00 4
No location: 0.00 0.33 0.61 0.06 1.00 18
Total 0.04 0.46 0.41 0.09 1.00 171
San Francisco Area:
Accidents of which were Day Time Night Time Evening or Question- Total Total
located in: Morning able Time Accidents
Dredged channel: 0.00 0.41 0.48 0.11 1.00 44
Open water: 0.00 0.60 0.35 0.05 1.00 20
Questionable location: 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.20 1.00 5
No location: 0.08 0.50 0.33 0.08 1.00 24
Total 0.03 0.47 0.40 0.10 1.00 93
Total Area:
Accidents of which were Day Time Night Time Evening or Question- Total Total
located in: Morning able Time Accidents
Dredged channel: 0.15 0.44 0.35 0.07 1.00 687
Open water 0.15 0.35 0.40 0.11 1.00 75
Questionable location: 0.08 0.43 0.45 0.05 1.00 145
No location: 0.20 0.46 0.31 0.03 1.00 208
Total 0.15 0.43 0.36 0.06 1.00 1115
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Chapter 6. HUMAN FACTORS RELATED TO THE
MARITIME INDUSTRY
6.1 Introduction
With the expansion of international shipping and the increasing number of commercial
modern ships, barges, tankers, and seafarers, etc., maritime safety concerns have been
amplified. After a series of catastrophic accidents such as Herald of Free Enterprise,
Scandinavian Star, and the grounding of Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska [4], the
concerns started to rise at a remarkable pace over the past decade. In the beginning,
stringent regulating efforts, like OPA 90, attempted to provide a solution to marine
casualties by increasing the construction and operating standards of ships [5]. Quality
assurance standards, such as the International Ship Managers Association's Code for Ship
Management Standards, the ISO 9000 series and the International Safety Management
Code, were then introduced [1,6].
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According to a variety of researchers [1,20,36,38,40-42,46-5 1], approximately 80-90% of
maritime accidents are due to human error. Nevertheless, human factors research has
been underemphasized in the maritime industry for several decades, especially when
compared to marine technical-related research. Fewer human factors projects and
research effort are ongoing in the marine field than in other fields such as aviation,
vehicles, land transportation, computer systems, nuclear plants, and manufacturing. It is
ironic that the United States Coast Guard, the government agency in charge of maritime
safety, has little historical information on human-caused accidents. Hence, it is doubtful
that marine technical designers and engineers fully understand the extent to which human
beings are part of, and more precisely speaking, the most important part of, the
integration of ship design and maritime transportation systems. I would argue that not
many marine engineers realize that successful systems encompass the successful
cooperation, integration, and communication between human beings and machines.
Merely adopting the most advanced technology and then trying to train human beings to
fit the technology is not the way to go. Let us take a snap shot of what Chapanis (1985)
wrote in Sanders and McCormick [19]; 'Human factors research discovers and applies
information about human behavior, abilities, limitations, and other characteristics to the
design of tools, machines, systems, tasks, jobs, and environments for productive, safe,
comfortable, and effective human use.' Moreover, Chapanis (1985) wrote that, 'the
objectives of human factors are very clear: the first objective is to enhance the
effectiveness and efficiency with which work and other activities are carried out,
resulting in increased convenience of use, reduced errors, and increased productivity; the
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second objective is to enhance certain desirable human values, including improved
safety, reduced fatigue and stress, increased comfort, greater user acceptance, increased
job satisfaction, and improved quality of life.'
This chapter, as described in Section 1.2, presents a complementary point of view on risk
analysis - human factors. The author believes that this aspect will have the most
significant impact on shipping safety and efficiency during the next decade. It is the
author's hope that by introducing the concept of the International Safety Management
(ISM) Code, some maritime regulations and final rules of the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and by modifying the accident data collection
procedures of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), an improved understanding of
factors contributing to vessel groundings beyond physical factors may be achieved.
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6.2 Literature Review
Recognizing that human strengths and limitations are the key issues to system design,
many papers and books have focused on understanding humans' physical, biological, and
psychological characteristics as applied to various industries, and on the reduction of risk
in complex man-machine systems. Different approaches and methodologies have been
addressed in these studies over the past few decades, both in qualitative and quantitative
terms. Many encouraging results have been achieved. Nevertheless, human factors
research, as described in Section 7.1, has been underemphasized in the maritime industry
for several decades. Fortunately, recognition of human factor as the most important
prevalent cause in maritime transportation accidents has been growing. Followings are
some references important in this thesis review:
A study conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard in August 1994 indicates that "investigation
officers do not feel confident of their abilities to identify and report human factor causes
of accidents" [20]. Similarly, "vessel owners and managers concerned with potential
liability are likely to be reluctant to provide accurate information on such issues". Hence,
human factor-specific parameters such as training, experience, fatigue, workload, age,
alcohol, and stress of persons are not easily collected in maritime historical databases.
USCG casualty data is a typical case of lack of such specific information. Nevertheless,
other transportation systems such as automobiles and airplanes perform well when
dealing with this problem. For example, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
addresses almost all facts, conditions, and circumstances in its annual review of aircraft
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accident data [44]. This publication presents a statistical approach to determining
probable cause(s) of an aviation accident by calculating the recorded 146 essential
items/parameters of information and hence contributes to more comprehensive and
fundamental analyses. It is the author's hope that these ideas may be of use in maritime
related agencies and organizations in a future revision of the casualty data system.
Kristiansen and Rennsvil [46] presented a quantitative risk estimation approach when
analyzing human and organization factors. A risk factor structure was established and
then these risk factors (such as individual factors, work practice, management,
ergonomics, and working conditions) were analyzed when considering a set of separate
spill scenarios. The findings indicated that preventive measures must be sought and
refined in navigation, tanker operation and general ship operation. Kristiansen [49] went
further by applying both the concept of risk analysis above and work psychology as an
approach to systematic learning from accidents. The Exxon Valdez grounding was used
as an example in the study. This methodology is a good example of an analytical
approach to casualty statistics and investigation applied to transit risk analysis.
Brown and Haugene [36] used another systematic approach. The study continued the
development of a grounding probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model generated by
Amrozowicz et al. [41,42,50] (described in Section 3.1) and expanded the earlier model
from merely individual factors to management and organizations factors, a more
complete approach to system failure. Expert opinion and Analytical Hierarchy Process
(AHP) were employed. In addition, the results were compared to important components
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emphasized by the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. The study concluded
that effective implementation in management and organizations factors could lead to over
99% reductions in the probability of grounding. The study also indicated that the
workload factor, which hasn't yet been covered in the ISM Code, is the greatest factor
contributing to the probability of groundings.
The pilot, recognized as the most critical individual factor in maritime accidents, has
been studied for several decades, from the beginning of marine human factors research.
The study "Minding the Helm" [38], discussed the role of pilot, pilot associations, and
pilot administrators, as well as the role of different parties such as government, port
authorities, marine organizations, and private stakeholders concerned with ship
operations. In addition, the study discussed and characterized broader topics such as risk
and safety assessment. The study aimed to minimize the number of accidents and sought
adequate methodologies of navigation and piloting to reduce operational, economical,
and environmental risks. It, indeed, contained valuable resources and information on the
marine transportation system. Finally, six recommendations for the United States Coast
Guard from the study are cited below. These suggestions are critical not only to the
USCG, but also important guidelines for all maritime transportation stakeholders:
For Risk in the Marine Operating Environment:
"Coast Guard should review and improve its capability to collect, analyze, and
publish marine safety data on casualties, accidents, incidents, and near misses so
that comprehensive safety performance data are available to guide
improvements in marine navigation and piloting."
For Human Systems:
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"Training programs should be developed concurrently with the introduction of
new technology, and mariners should be trained in the use of this technology.
Mariners should also be appraised of changes in roles, functions, and
organizations that can result from introduction of this technology."
For Marine Pilotage:
"Nationally accepted professional and administrative standards and guidelines
should be established without delay for all elements of existing pilotage
systems. These elements include the professional development, licensing, and
administration of pilots and pilotage with regard to pilot training, qualifications,
pilotage boards, casualty investigation, discipline, and vessel pilotage
requirements."
For Waterways Management:
"The Coast Guard should continue to augment its effort to identify
substandard vessels and take whatever action necessary to enforce
compliance with applicable international guidelines and U.S. requirements."
For Navigation and piloting technology:
"The CG should strongly encourage the development and updating of
international technical and performance criteria and corresponding national
standards and criteria for advanced navigation systems. The introduction of
electronic charting and precision navigation systems suitable as onboard aids
to enhance navigation safety should occur as soon as practical, consistent
with the application for which this technology is appropriate and with the
development of the supporting infrastructure that is necessary to enable its
effective use."
For Traditional Aids to Navigation:
"The Coast Guard should maintain and enhance short-range aids to
navigation that support traditional and evolving navigational technologies and
should continue efforts to improve visual and electronic acquisition of buoys
during unfavorable operating conditions. The feasibility of electronic ranges
and distance measuring equipment for specialized local use should be
examined."
In other research, Clench [47] presented a general systems approach and a framework of
the human element in maritime systems. Cremers and Chawla [48] addressed how and
why incident and accident reporting is critical. Van Tassel [51] and Hesler [40] focused
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on education, training and simulation. In addition, increasing studies in categorized
human factors issues have produced a more complete understanding of ship transit risk.
This author suggests that through assessing issues such as maintenance and inspection,
drug and alcohol abuse, individual/crew factors research (such as individual differences,
functions of teams, recognition of their significance, behavior, education, values,
knowledge, fatigue, boredom, stress, workload, motivation, and attitude), management
program and man/machine interface, working conditions, task analysis, team work, job
design, and selection, and individuals /teams /procedures /organizations /communications
/regulations integration in transit risk research, an improved understanding of factors
contributing to vessel groundings beyond physical factors and prevention of serious
accidents can be achieved.
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6.3 International Safety Management (ISM) Code
Before World War II, the United Kingdom played a leading role in concluding various
international conventions relating to maritime safety and pollution [14]. After World
War II, the United Nations created the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) to deal with all maritime matters, such as regulations, standards,
legal issues, and practical technical matters. IMCO's name was changed to International
Maritime Organization (IMO) later [7-12]. In the field of maritime safety, IMO covers
the following aspects: construction and equipment; safety of navigation; cargo handling;
crew training; and facilities both ashore and at sea. In the field of prevention and control
of marine pollution, IMO works on the following issues: control of operational
discharges; prevention of accidents; minimization of spills; combating pollution; and
liability and compensation. From 1965 to 1986, there were 28 international conventions
sponsored by IMO [13-16], which also adopted numerous codes, guidelines, manuals,
and other recommendations.
Around 1986, the international shipping industry produced its Code of Good
Management Practice in Safe Ship Operation. After about seven years of development
and revision, the guidelines formed the basis of the "International Safety Management
Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention", also known as the
International Safety Management (ISM) Code. This is a document addressing shipboard
and shore-based management for the safe operation of ships and the prevention of marine
pollution [6, 17]. The ISM Code was adopted by the International Maritime Organization
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as Resolution A.741(18) on November 4, 1993. Following the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Conference in May 1994, the ISM Code was applied to ships regardless of the
date of construction, as follows [1,6,17]:
* Passenger ships including passenger high-speed craft, not later than 1 July 1998.
* Oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carries, bulk carriers and cargo high-speed craft of
displacement at least 500 gross tons, not later than 1 July 1998.
* Other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units of displacement at least 500 gross
tons, not later than 1 July 2002.
The process followed towards the award of the "Document of Compliance" for the managing
company and the "Safety Management Certificate" for each of the ships under management
usually comprises multiple steps. The exact number of these steps as well as their nature
depends heavily on the organization responsible for awarding the ISM compliance
documentation. In Resolution A. 741 (18), IMO has provided guidelines concerning the
certification process covering the following twelve areas:
1. Safety and environmental protection policy
2. Company responsibility and authority
3. Designated person(s)
4. Master's responsibility and authority
5. Resources and personnel
6. Development of plans for shipboard operations
7. Emergency preparedness
8. Reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences
9. Maintenance of the ship and equipment
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10. Documentation
11. Company verification, review and evaluation
12. Certification, verification and control
The author believes that the Code is a good document and that through the mandatory
implementation of the Code, most sub-standard shipping companies could run their ships
more safely and efficiently. For further study, the author suggests investigating the degree of
success of the mandatory implementation -- will shipping companies and related industries
comply totally with the all of these codes, regulations, guidelines, and the legal issues? -- and
hence a periodical revision of the Code could be achieved through the survey.
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6.4 The United States Coast Guard (USCG)
USCG was established under Title 46 U.S. Code, Chapter 43. It responds to tasks in
several mission/program areas such as ships, aircraft, boats, and shore stations. Its four
main missions are law enforcement, maritime safety, marine environmental protection,
and national security. Followings is a summary of USCG's Maritime Safety mission
[18]:
"Boating Safety: To reduce the risk of loss of life, personal injury and property
damage in recreational boating, and to foster greater development, use and
enjoyment of all U.S. waters."
"Marine Inspection: To minimize deaths, injuries, property loss and
environmental damage by developing and enforcing standards and policy for
safe design/construction, maintenance and operations of vessels and offshore
facilities engaged in commercial, scientific, or exploratory activity in marine
environment, and to facilitate marine commerce through documentation and
measurement of vessels."
"Marine Licensing: To ensure that all vessels are adequately manned with a
minimum number of qualified crewmembers to safely operate the vessel on a
particular route and under specific operating conditions. Each crewmember has
to meet minimum qualification criteria. The criteria involve specific experience
and successful completion of tests and/or training based on national and
international requirements. The scope of the program extends beyond the
vessel's crew to encompass pilots and instructors. These procedures are
designed to minimize deaths, injuries, and damage to the environment by
ensuring that the vessel has an adequate, qualified crew to deal with all
situations that may develop."
"Merchant Marine Veterans Branch (World War II): As custodians of Merchant
Mariner's records, the Coast Guard is tasked with determining eligibility for
veterans status and issuing Form DD-214, "Certificate of Release or Discharge
from Active Duty", and the "Certificate of Honorable Discharge/General
Discharge" to the seaman or the survivors of deceased seamen."
"Recreational Boating Safety: There are about 20 million recreational boats in
the United States. To improve the demonstrated knowledge, skills, abilities and
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attitudes of boaters; to improve the safety of boats and their associated
equipment; to improve the physical and operational boating environment; to
improve Inter-modal and Inter-agency cooperation, coordination and
assistance."
"Prevention Through People" is a new program, in which USCG emphasizes partnering
as a tool to enhance the effectiveness of the marine safety and environmental protection
program [31].
Generally speaking, USCG personnel are both administrators and operators in charge of
many complex issues, some of which may be difficult to handle. For example, in
addition to the mission mentioned above, the USCG has been asked to continue the
effort, as described in Section 7.2, for risk reduction in the marine operating environment,
for human systems, for marine pilotage, for waterways management, for navigation and
piloting technology, and for traditional aids to navigation. It is hard for any agency to
play all such major roles in various topics.
Maybe the appropriate way is to have the organization focus in a more specific field and
to increase its research budget to enhance its function. For example, the USCG casualty
data system, as described in Section 6.2, should be revised significantly. Since the issue
is not so easy, as suggested in Section 6.5, comprehensive human factors related data
should also recorded in a revised USCG casualty data system.
I
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6.5 OSHA Related to the Maritime Industry
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is discussed in this chapter
because of its contribution to a range of human factors research. An increasing number
of OSHA's maritime-related conventions have been produced during the past two
decades, and the trend is continuing. Since all of the final rules are more concerned with
shipyards and terminals, and none of them is specifically about maritime transportation,
the final rules require up-to-date investigation. The author believes that through the
collaboration of marine specialists and human factors specialists in the OSHA effort,
appropriate maritime related regulations and final rules could be generated in the near
future.
6.5.1 A Brief History of OSHA
The following is a summary from OSHA's website [21]:
"In 1970, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (P.L. 91-
596, 29 U.S.C. 650 et seq.) to assure "so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions", which established
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), granted the
Secretary of Labor the authority for two years to adopt, under section 6(a) of the
Act, "any established Federal standard" as an OSHA standard, and to
promulgate and enforce standards. The 25 States which operate OSHA-
approved State plans and provide occupational safety and health coverage to
40% of the nations' workplaces share in this mission."
"Since OSHA's inception, the nation has made substantial progress. For
example, since 1970, the work-related fatality rate has been cut in half and
overall injury and illness rates have declined in industries where OSHA has
focused its attention. In some areas the progress has been notable: brown lung
disease has been virtually eliminated in the textile industry, and trenching and
excavation fatalities have been reduced by 35% since 1970."
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"However, workplace hazards continue to inflict a tremendous toll in both
human and economic costs. Employers reported 6.3 million work injuries and
515,000 cases of occupational illnesses in 1994. That same year, occupational
injuries alone cost $121 billion in lost wages and lost productivity,
administrative expenses, health care, and other costs. This figure does not
include the costs of occupational diseases. The reality remains that today six
thousand Americans die from workplace injuries each year. An estimated
50,000 workers die every year from illnesses caused by workplace exposures,
and six million people suffer from non-fatal workplace injuries. Injuries alone
cost U.S. businesses over $110 billion annually."
6.5.2 Maritime Related Agenda in OSHA:
The OSH Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 656) established a Maritime Advisory Committee for
Occupational Safety and Health (MACOSH) under section 7(a) to advise the Secretary of
Labor on matters relating to occupational safety and health programs, policies, and
standards in the maritime industries of the United States.
The current regulatory agenda is as follows:
(1) Access/Egress, Shipyards (F); (2) Eliminating and Improving Regulations
(P)*; (3) Ergonomics (P); (4) General Working Conditions, Shipyards (P); (5)
Longshoring/Marine Terminals (F); (6) Personal Protective Equipment,
Shipyards (F); (7) Revision of 6(a) Standards (P)*; (8) Scaffolds, Shipyards (F).
(The meaning of (P) is Proposed Rulemaking (Policy); (F) is Final Rulemaking;
and * is Presidential Initiative).
Fire Protection, Shipyards (P) is considered as long term regulatory agenda.
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6.5.3 State of the Art of OSHA's Final Rules or Proposed Rules
All maritime related regulations and final rules from 1980 to 1997 are covered and cited
here. Note that it is not necessary to look at the issues before 1980 because all the latest
issues are updated from old regulations and final rules, if the old issue exists.
All the regulations and final rules are categorized into four subjects: Shipyard; Personal
Protective Equipment; Longshoring and Marine Terminals; and Safety Standards for
Scaffolds used in Shipyard Employment. Each of the subjects is described as follows:
1. Confined and Enclosed Spaces and Other Dangerous Atmospheres in
Employment (Final Rules) [22] (source document approximately 120 pages)
1.1 Effective Date: The Final Rule becomes effective on October 24, 1994.
1.2 Supplementary Information: The principal authors of this final rule are from
Office of Maritime Standards; Office of Fire Protection Engineering and Safety
Systems; Office of Regulatory Analysis; Office of the Solicitor, U.S.
Department of Labor.
1.3 Abstract:
The previous Subpart B of part 1915 sets out requirements for work in
explosive and other dangerous atmospheres in vessels and vessel sections and
applies to ship building, ship repairing, and ship breaking operations and to
related employment. The final rule being promulgated today extends the
protection offered by these previous rules to employees entering any confined
or enclosed space or working in any other dangerous atmosphere in shipyard
employment on board or on land. The final rule also simplifies and clarifies
some of the requirements in the previous standards. The final rule includes
requirements for a shipyard competent person, a Marine Chemist, a Certified
Industrial Hygienist, or a Coast Guard authorized person to evaluate conditions
within a confined or enclosed space and to institute measures to ensure that
entrants are protected. It also contains requirements for posting unsafe spaces,
for safe performance of cleaning, cold work, and hot work, and for
classification.
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1.4. Table of Contents:
I. Background; II. Summary and Explanation of Final Rule; III. Statutory
Considerations; IV. Summary of Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Regulatory
Flexibility Certification, and Environmental Impact Assessment; V. Effective
Date; VI. Information Collection Requirements; VII. Federalism; VIII. State
Plans; IX. Authority.
2. Personal Protective Equipment for Shipyard Employment (PPE) (Final Rules)
(source document approximately 100 pages)
This final rule on PPE was finalized in 1996 (please see the following cited part A [23]), and
amended later in 1997 (please see the following cited part B [24]):
2.1.A. Effective Date: this final rule is approved by the Director of the
Federal Register as of August 22, 1996.
2.2.A Abstract:
The OSHA is revising its standards for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
for Shipyard Employment, 29 CFR part 1915, subpart I. The final rule updates,
reorganizes, and simplifies shipyard employment PPE standards into a
comprehensive framework that encompasses the shipbuilding, ship repair, and
ship breaking industries. Where appropriate, the final rule deletes existing
specification-oriented provisions that limit employer innovation and
incorporates performance-oriented language.
2.3.A Table of Contents:
I. Background; II. Workplace Hazards; III. Summary and Explanation of Final
Rule; IV. Summary of Final Economic Analysis, Regulatory Flexibility,
Certification, and Environmental Impact Assessment; V. Paperwork Burden;
VI. Statutory Considerations; VII. Federalism; VIII. State Plans; IX. Authority.
2.1.B Dates: The amendment in this final rule and 1915.152 (b) and (e),
1915.159(d) and 1915.160(d) published at 61 FR 26352 and corrected at 61 FR
29957 are effective July 21, 1997.
2.2.B Abstract:
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The OSHA is announcing that the collections of information regarding
1915.152(b), hazard assessment and equipment selection, 1915.152(e), training,
1915.159(d), personal fall arrest systems training, and 1915.160(d), positioning
device systems training have been approved by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. This document
announces the effective dates of those paragraphs and the OMB approval
number 1218-0215.
3. Longshoring and Marine Terminals (Final Rules) [25,26] (source document
approximately 240 pages)
In this category, the final rules were presented first on 07/05/1983, and more recently in
1997.
3.1 Effective Dates: This rule is approved by the Director of the Federal
Register as of January 21, 1998 and becomes effective on January 21, 1998
3.2 Abstract:
The OSHA is revising its Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring and
those parallel sections of its Marine Terminals Standard. These rules address
cargo handling and related activities conducted aboard vessels (the Longshoring
Standard) and landside operations at marine terminals (the Marine Terminals
Standard). The comprehensive revisions to the Longshoring Standard
essentially rewrite that standard for the first time since it was adopted in 1971
under Section 6(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The
amendments being made to the Marine Terminals Standard will provide
consistency with the language of the new Longshoring Standard. The changes
that OSHA is making to both standards are part of OSHA's continuing efforts to
reinvent its workplace regulations to keep them current with evolving work
practices and to reduce inconsistencies in regulatory requirements. Although
the longshoring and marine terminal rules are "vertical" standards that apply
only to longshoring and marine terminal activities, OSHA has also made minor
changes to some of the general industry provisions referenced within these
rules. These changes, which are non-substantive, have been made to conform
with the general industry requirements to the terminology used in the marine
cargo-handling environment.
This final document contains requirements for the testing and certification of
specific types of cargo lifting appliances and associated auxiliary gear and other
cargo handling equipment such as conveyors and industrial trucks; access to
vessels; entry into hazardous atmospheres; working surfaces; and use of
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personal protective equipment. Additionally, OSHA addresses specialized
longshoring operations such as containerized cargo, logging, and roll-on/roll-off
(Ro-Ro) operations.
The principal hazards this rule addresses are injuries and fatalities associated
with cargo lifting gear, transfer of vehicular cargo, manual cargo handling, and
exposure to hazardous atmospheres. OSHA also addresses those hazards posed
by more modem and sophisticated cargo handling methods, such as
intermodalism.
The preamble to the final rule on the Longshoring and Marine Terminals
Standards discusses the events leading to the final rule, the Summary of the
Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, and the rationale
behind the specific provisions set forth in the final Standard. The discussion
follows this outline: I. Background; II. Pertinent Legal Authority; III. Review of
General Industry Standards for Applicability to Longshoring Operations; IV.
Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule; V. Other Issues; VI. Summary of
the Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis; VII.
Environmental Impact; VIII. Recordkeeping and Paperwork Requirements; IX.
State Plan Requirements; X. Federalism; XI. Unfunded Mandates.
4. Safety Standards for Scaffolds Used in Shipyard Employment (Proposed
Regulations, not yet Effective) [27] (source documents vary)
Abstract:
The OSHA is reopening the record for the proposed revision of the regulation of
scaffolds used in shipyard employment (part 1915, subpart N) (53 FR 48182,
November 29, 1988). This reopening incorporates the entire record for
scaffolds used in the construction industry (part 1926, subpart L) (Docket S-
205, 51 FR 42680, November 25, 1986; Docket S-205A, 58 FR 16509, March
29, 1993; Docket S-205B, 59 FR 4615, February 1, 1994) including the
scaffold-related materials from the record for the proposed general industry
standard for walking and working surfaces (part 1910, subpart D) (Docket S-
041, 55 FR 13360, April 10, 1990) that were previously incorporated into the
subpart L record in Docket S-205B. Through this notice, the Agency also
requests input on the scope and application of subpart N; the appropriateness of
replacing the term "capable person" with the term "qualified person" throughout
subpart N; the maximum permissible distance between the front edge of a
platform and the face of a vessel or structure; the requirements for a scaffold
that the Agency considers to be an interior hung scaffold; the frequency of
scaffold inspections; the qualifications for persons performing scaffold
inspections; and the requirements for the performance of electric welding
operations from suspension scaffolds. In addition, this notice corrects a
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typographic error in proposed paragraph 1915.252(b)(18)(iv) and invites public
comment on that paragraph as corrected. The information received as a result
of this action will be used by the Agency in developing its final rule for
scaffolds used in shipyard employment.
5. Other Latest Maritime Related Meetings Announced by OSHA in 1997 [28]:
5.1 [10/09/1997] Federal Register #: 62:52671-52673 - Longshoring and Marine
Terminals.
5.2 [08/19/1997] Federal Register #: 62:44149 - Maritime Advisory Committee
for Occupational Safety and Health.
5.3 [09/09/1997] Federal Register #: 62:47519 - Fire Protection for Shipyard
Employment Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee.
5.4 [06/26/1997] Federal Register #: 62:34417 - Fire Protection for Shipyard
Employment Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee.
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6.6 The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
6.6.1 Issues Raised by Business in Recent Years
In the maritime industry, controversial issues raised by different stakeholders against
OSHA and two litigation cases addressed below are summarized. It is the author's hope
that through understanding of these cases, dealing with similar challenges raised by
maritime related parties, when implementing mandatory regulations such as the ISM
Code, would be more comprehensive.
"The cost to a business or the entire industry for maintaining OSHA's regulatory
standards versus the benefit in improved safety or health to employees is an
important and somewhat controversial issue in the litigation process. In
essence, the issue centers around the question of: what, if any, allowable or
reasonable costs can be weighed against the loss of a life or an unhealthy work
environment that will result in longer term fatalities or illness? In the matter of
life or death, is it morally right to debate the issue of reasonable costs to ensure
reasonably safe or healthy working conditions? Or must safe and healthy
working conditions be enforced at any expense? Should a business employing
hundreds or thousands of laborers be forced to terminate production when it has
been proven that the work environment results in long-term debilitating illness
and a shorter life span for its employees? Is the cost defined as the long-term
illness inevitable for the employee, or is the cost the level of unemployment
and products unavailable for consumption if the plant is closed? Who should
make these critical decisions? Is it the obligation of the government as it strives
to respond to the will of the people who govern, or is it a personal decision that
should be left to the judgment of each individual within the society? These
questions constitute the perplexity and incalculable nature of the controversial
issues that engulf the agency's regulations and enforcement activities." [30]
First Case: Litigation: R. Marshall, Sec. of Labor v. American Petroleum
Institute, 65 Led., 2nd, 1010(1980):
"Scientific evidence had earlier confirmed that excessive exposure to benzene (a
chemical agent that is used by many different manufacturers of petrochemical
products) constituted a serious health risk and could cause leukemia. What
level of exposure constituted a serious, excessive or high risk had not been
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determined. The agency ordered businesses to introduce costly safeguards to
substantially lower their employee level of exposure. The industry argued that
OSHA's mandate was unreasonable and should not be imposed as an
enforceable regulation. Regulatory policies must simply be based upon
calculable and supportive scientific evidence and not unsubstantiated
speculation. Ultimately, the Supreme Court supported the industry position and
ordered OSHA to eliminate its earlier regulation. In essence, the Court stated
that regulatory policies must be supported with and justified by research results
and scientific evidence." [30]
Second Case: Litigation: American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., v. R.J.
Donovan, Sec. of Labor, 69L Ed., 2d. 185(1981).
"Employees inhale cotton dust which contributes to long-term lung problems.
Substantiated differences existed between OSHA and industry research
regarding the number of industry workers affected and the actual cost to the
industry of complying with the agency's exposure standards. The agency
estimated that more than 20% of all industry employees were afflicted with
cotton dust, whereas the industry argued that, at most, it might be one-tenth of
that number. Also, OSHA reported that it cost the industry about $650 million
to comply with its standards and the industry's estimate was almost four times
that figure. The Supreme Court decision in this case was particularly important
because it rejected the judicial or regulatory need to evaluate the cost versus
benefit of the standard as a justification for agency policy. The Supreme
Court's decision focused on the benefit that results from enforcement rather than
the cost that is incurred to ensure compliance. The evident need to correct a
risky and unsafe work environment is the only requirement needed to justify an
agency response." [30]
6.6.2 Suggestions for Cooperation among Agencies
Based on the Supreme Court's statement that regulatory policies must be supported and
justified with research results and scientific evidence and statistics of industrial injuries,
disabilities, and fatalities information, it is suggested that OSHA strengthen its
relationship with the following maritime related or human factors related agencies,
according to the author's opinion, when conducting a human factors research. (In fact,
some of them are already cooperating with OSHA). Among those agencies, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and National Occupational Research Agenda
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(NIOSH/NORA) have a high reputation for their contributions to quantify human factors.
Hence it is suggested that NIOSH / NORA be given the highest priority for cooperation.
1. Department of Health and Human Services: National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH); National Occupational Research Agenda (NORA).
2. Department of Transportation: the USCG; Maritime Administration; Federal Aviation
Administration.
3. Department of Defense: Naval Medical Research and Development Command.
4. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics Mine Safety and Health
Administration Wage and Hour Division.
5. Department of Justice: National Institute of Justice.
6. Environmental Protection Agency: National Exposure Research Laboratory: Office of
Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances.
7. Department of Energy: Office of the Environment, Safety and Health; Office of
Worker Health and Safety; Agency for Health Care Policy and Research.
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Chapter 7 CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Conclusions from Section I
The first part of this thesis presents an analysis of potential factors contributing to
groundings when ships transit in and out of ports. Two important results are obtained:
First, the results suggest that tide forecast error has no significant effect as a risk factor
for groundings in dredged channels and open water. Second, the results suggest that
night navigation is far more risky than day navigation.
Other products of this study include:
An updated grounding location database was established for this research. This data
source could be used for more efficient risk modeling in the future. Secondly, the tide
analysis showed that the predictions of tide level tended to underestimate actual water
levels for the past 15 to 18 years; and the probability density function of tide levels
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generated for the past two decades is a useful data source that can be applied to future
tide-related research. Finally, the results suggest that wind speed and visibility effects are
not significantly different for accidents occurring in dredged channels and in open water.
In a future study, a more careful analysis of the data is suggested to verify these two risk
factors.
For data gathering, Kite-Powell et al. [32] summarized some suggestions to the United
States Coast Guard for USCG casualty data collection for future research:
First, generally: (a) adopt consistent criteria across ports/reporting units for determining
what events merit an entry in the database; (b) each entry should be consistent with each
accident, i.e., no two reports coincident with one accident; (c) accuracy and completeness
are the key issues, e.g., the location of each accident and its corresponding physical
parameters such as wind speed, time, visibility, tide levels, wave conditions, etc.
Secondly, (a) more vessel-specific parameters such as draft, trim, speed, heading should
be collected; (b) more environmental parameters such as current speed and direction
should be collected; (c) use/presence of tugs, presence of pilot(s) should be collected.
In the near future, a larger-scale model of risk is expected to incorporate results of the
port-level analysis and investigate more local factors, such as specifics of channel design,
navigational aids configuration, currents, etc. Meanwhile, an advanced model of
I
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economic risk providing estimates of economic loss associated with the physical risk of
grounding for a given region is an important topic for further study.
7.2 Conclusions from Section II
Inasmuch as human factors is an important determinant contributing to maritime
transportation risk, how this factor is analyzed becomes a key issue for risk analysis of
ship groundings. USCG has set up a human factors division, yet much progress still
needs to be made. For example, factors such as "human errors" and "low visibility"
haven't been included in the USCG casualty data system. In addition, recommendations
to USCG from "Minding the Helm" (described in Section 7.2) addressed this point, and
this means the human factors division is not yet functioning completely. The ISM Code
contains some human factors issues, but is yet to be refined. For example, the workload
factor, the most important component contributing to the probability of tanker
groundings, according to Brown and Haugene [36], is not covered in the ISM Code.
OSHA supports many ongoing research projects, private and public; has been performing
a lot of exhaustive controlled experiments; pursued different approaches to analyze
human factors as a risk component in different industries; and consequently helps solve
the problem of a lack of quantitative data in the historical record. Some analyzed results
have become the foundation of OSHA's regulations and final rules. In extending the
results from other industries to maritime transportation, however, OSHA's rules for the
past 20 years (even tracking back to the early 50's and other related rules) aim merely to
reduce personal injuries and deaths, and only on land. In addition, the agenda of OSHA's
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long term regulatory activity considers only fire protection and shipyard issues. Hence,
merely obeying OSHA's regulations and rules is not sufficient and not appropriate to
reduce the marine transportation risk. It is therefore vital to revise OSHA's maritime
related regulations and bring its rules up to date.
This study suggests that, for a more complete risk assessment, the collaboration of
OSHA's human factors specialists, IMO regulation's specialists, and maritime related
research organizations such as USCG is necessary. By supporting comprehensive risk-
assessment research, risk models for transit groundings can be improved. Furthermore,
the risk model would greatly contribute to the ISM Code and OSHA's maritime related
final rules. Additionailly, the results can be applied to other marine accident analyses.
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Probability Density Function of Predicted (01/01/81-
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Figure 3 - Probability Density Function of Predicted and Observed Water Level,
Boston (8443970)
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Cumulative Distribution Function, Boston
(8443970, 01/01/81-12/31/95, 131,472 records)
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00% 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 000 000 00 000 00
Difference between Predicted and Observed Water Level
(mm)
Figure 4 - Cumulative Distribution of Difference between Predicted and Observed
Water Level, Boston (8443970)
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Probability Density Function of Predicted (01/01/81-
12/31/98, 157,776 records) and Observed (01/01/81-
01/31/98, 145,490 records) Water Level, Houston-
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Figure 6 - Probability Density Function of Predicted and Observed Water Level,
Houston-Galveston (8771450)
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Cumulative Distribution Function, Houston-Galveston
(8771450, 01/01/81-01/31/98, 145,490 records)
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Figure 7 - Cumulative Distribution of Difference between Predicted and Observed
Water Level, Houston-Galveston (8771450)
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Figure 8 - Probability Density Function of Difference between Predicted and
Observed Water Level, Houston-Galveston (8771450)
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Probability Density Function of Predicted (01/01/81-
12/31/98, 157,776 records) and Observed (01/01/81-
01/31/98, 149,760 records) Water Level, San Francisco
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Figure 9 - Probability Density Function of Predicted and Observed Water Level,
San Francisco (9414290)
Physical Risk Analysis of Ship Grounding
Cumulative Distribution Function, San Francisco
(9414290, 01/01/81-01/31/98, 149,752 records)
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Figure 10 - Cumulative Distribution of Difference between Predicted and Observed
Water Level, San Francisco (9414290)
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Figure 11 - Probability Density Function of Difference between Predicted and
Observed Water Level, San Francisco (9414290)
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Probability Density Function of Predicted (01/01/81-
12/31/98, 157,776 records) and Observed (01/01/81-
01/31/98, 149,760 records) Water Level, Tampa/St.
Petersburg (8726520)
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Figure 12 - Probability Density Function of Predicted and Observed Water Level,
Tampa/St. Petersburg (8726520)
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Cumulative Distribution Function, Tampa/St. Petersburg
(8726520, 01/01/81-01/31/98, 149,755 records)
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Figure 13 - Cumulative Distribution of Difference between Predicted and Observed
Water Level, Tampa/St. Petersburg (8726520)
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Figure 14 - Probability Density Function of Difference between Predicted and
Observed Water Level, Tampa/St. Petersburg (8726520)
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Probability Density Function of Predicted (01/01/81-
12/31/95, 131,472 records) and Observed (01/01/81-
12/31/97, 149,016 records) Water Level, New York/Battery
(8518750)
c
e-
-t
o
.Q
..
.0019
0O
0.040
0.035
0.030
0.025
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
11
00Water Level (above MLLW, 0 0m)
Water Level (above MLLW, mm)
I-- Predicted records -- - Observed records
Figure 15 - Probability Density Function of Predicted and Observed Water Level,
New York/Battery (8518750)
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Figure 16 - Cumulative Distribution of Difference between Predicted and Observed
Water Level, New York/Battery (8518750)
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Figure 17 - Probability Density Function of Difference between Predicted and
Observed Water Level, New York/Battery (8518750)
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Figure 18 - Forecast Error of Water Level during Groundings, Boston (8443970)
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Figure 19 - Forecast Error of Water Level during Groundings, Houston-Galveston
(8771450)
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Figure 20 - Forecast Error of Water Level during Groundings, San Francisco
(9414290)
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Figure 21 - Forecast Error of Water Level during Groundings, Tampa/St.
Petersburg (8726520)
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Appendix
Helpful References
Almost all of the OSHA Final Rules were accompanied by references, which are useful. The
following 17 papers are one example which is cited from [23]:
1. U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. 1994
U.S. Industrial Outlook. 2
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3. U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Preliminary Report
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Repairing (Industry 3731). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1990.
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Industry Service 1987 Census of Manufactures: Shipbuilding and
Repairing (Industry 3731). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1989.
5. CONSAD Research Corp. Data to Support a Regulatory Analysis of the
Proposed Standard for Shipbuilding and Repairing. Final Report. Prepared
for the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, under Contract No. J-9-F-4-0024. Pittsburgh: CONSAD,
November 1985.
6. CONSAD Research Corp. Data to Support A Regulatory Analysis of the
Proposed Standard for Shipbuilding and Repairing: Subpart B. Prepared for
the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, under Contract No. J-9-F-4-0024. Pittsburgh: CONSAD,
June 1986.
7. Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense. First Report of the
Commission of Merchant Marine and Defense, Appendices. Washington,
D.C., September 30, 1987.
8. Dun and Bradstreet Financial Data. 1989, 1991, 1994.
9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, May, 1995.
10. Executive Office of the President. OMB. Standard Industrial Classification
Manual. 1987.
11. Main Hurdman/KGM. Profile of the Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry.
Prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. Washington, D.C., October 1984. 62 Pp.
12. Shipyard Council of America. "Merchant Shipbuilding" September, 1987;
"Naval Shipbuilding" January, 1992; "Ship Construction Report" July,
1991.
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by Industry 1992.
15. Sulowski, Andrew, "Selecting Fall Arresting Systems," National Safety
News, Oct. 1979.
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